The proposed press publishers' right: is it really worth all this noise?

Again on the proposal
(for a directive on copyright
in the Digital Single Market)

As reported and covered in a number of previous posts [here, here, here], in the context of its Digital Single Market Strategy (DSMS) on 14 September last the EU Commission unveiled a new copyright package, consisting of a number of proposals aimed at improving the existing EU copyright framework.

Among the contents of the package, there is the already famous proposal for a directive on copyright in the Digital Single Market (DSM Directive) [here]. 

Among other things, the DSM Directive intends to introduce into the EU copyright framework a new related right in press publications.

Article 11 of the directive states:

"1. Member States shall provide publishers of press publications [what is to be intended by 'press publications' is clarified at Recital 33 of the directive] with the rights provided for in Article 2 and Article 3(2) of Directive 2001/29/EC for the digital use of their press publications. 

2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 shall leave intact and shall in no way affect any rights provided for in Union law to authors and other rightholders, in respect of the works and other subject-matter incorporated in a press publication. Such rights may not be invoked against those authors and other rightholders and, in particular, may not deprive them of their right to exploit their works and other subject-matter independently from the press publication in which they are incorporated. 

3. Articles 5 to 8 of Directive 2001/29/EC [the InfoSoc Directive] and Directive 2012/28/EU [the Orphan Works Directive] shall apply mutatis mutandis in respect of the rights referred to in paragraph 1. 

4. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 shall expire 20 years after the publication of the press publication. This term shall be calculated from the first day of January of the year following the date of publication."

However, the drafting of this provision and related recitals (31 to 36) raises a number of technical questions, as well as a practical, fundamental, one.

When less may be actually more

The technical questions

A first question may be why Article 11 refers to Article 3(2) of the InfoSoc Directive [making available right] instead of Article 3(1) of the same directive [right of communication to the public], also considering that the last sentence in Recital 33 refers to the right of communication to the public. 

The question is not just pedanticacademic, because the rights of communication to the public and making available to the public are not the same thing. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has made this clear, more recently in its C More judgment [here].

A second point is that it is not entirely clear why Recital 33 contains a reference to hyperlinks, by saying that those which do not amount to acts of communication to the public are outside the scope of the new right. 

First, the new related right is not about the right of communication to the public, but rather reproduction and making available to the public. 

Secondly, if the new related right does not go beyond copyright [as Article 11(2) stresses], surely saying that "protection does not extend to acts of hyperlinking which do not constitute communication to the public" is not really necessary. 

Finally, hyperlinks are not everything the right is about: Article 11 refers to the "digital use" of press publications. A "digital use" may range from the scanning of press publications to the display of relevant excerpts and everything in between.

Charlie is scared ...
but is there anything to really fear?

A practical question

Last week I had the chance to speak to a number of people, both stakeholders and legal practitioners, over meals and at events. While coming from different positions in relation to the current EU copyright debate, they all seemed to have the same question:

Will the press publishers' right have any practical relevance?

Despite some earlier academic concerns, the answer may be 'NO' in the majority of cases. The reason for this is twofold.

First, the new press publishers' right is certainly not broader than copyright (and is certainly shorter). Article 11 is clear in saying that the rights of reproduction and making available, along with related exceptions and limitations, are to be intended in the same sense as the same rights and exceptions under the copyright framework. So, to one who already owns the copyright to a press publication, will ownership of also the press publishers’ right mean anything (useful)?

Secondly - as a matter of practice and possibly with the exclusion of certain free-lance journalists who manage to retain ownership of copyright in their pieces - press publishers already own the copyright to the press publications authored by their journalists-employees. And copyright already provides a fairly powerful tool. Just to provide an example, yesterday I re-read the CJEU decision in Infopaq in preparation for the second IP class with my Southampton Law School undergraduate students.

Readers will promptly remember that that case - a reference for a preliminary ruling from Denmark - concerned indeed press publications scanned without the prior consent or relevant rightholders, ie press publishers. 

The CJEU ended up saying that merely "storing an extract of a protected work comprising 11 words and printing out that extract, is such as to come within the concept of reproduction in part within the meaning of Article 2 of Directive 2001/29/EC ..., if the elements thus reproduced are the expression of the intellectual creation of their author".

Would have things been any better if - besides copyright - press publishers could have also invoked the ad hoc press publishers' right in an Infopaq-like scenario?

Conclusion

All in all, it is unclear whether and to what extent the press publishers' right will change things in relation to digital uses of press publications.

Also the reference to the CJEU decision in Reprobel [here] in Recital 36 seems a bit out of context [and possibly only makes sense if, instead of Article 11, it is read as referring to Article 12], since that decision nothing had to do with digital uses of press publications. Reprobel was completely a non-digital case concerning private copying levies in printers.

In the majority of cases the addition of the press publishers’ right extra-layer of protection is unlikely to make a difference. But am I missing something here? As always, readers' feedback is very welcome!

Academics stress importance of preserving consistency and integrity of EU framework on content monitoring

Professor Kat McKitten
writing his diary at work

A group of EU-based academics (including myself) has just published a letter addressed at a number of EU institutions [you can see the one addressed to the EU Commission here] in the aftermath of the release by the EU Commission of the second copyright package [here and here].

Among other things, the letter focuses on proposed action in relation to content monitoring by intermediaries in the context of the so called 'value gap' proposal [Recitals 38-39 and Article 13 of the proposal for a directive on copyright in the digital single market], and stresses how the rationale of the existing prohibition of a general monitoring obligation on online intermediaries [as resulting from Article 15 of the ECommerce Directive] is rooted within a number of central objectives, including: 

1. the encouragement of innovation, which is essential for the flourishing of the Digital Single Market; and 
2. the protection of fundamental rights of all internet users, including those laid down in Article 7 and 8, Articles 9, 10 and 14 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

 The letter asks to:

• maintain the prohibition of general monitoring obligations and make sure that exceptions to general monitoring obligations are always narrowly construed, always pursue a legitimate aim, are always based on a clear and foreseeable legal ground and are always proportionate;
• make sure that a discussion on the importance of Articles 14 and 15 of the ECommerce Directive is undertaken;
• open a public and transparent discussion on the interplay between the proposed copyright directive and the ECommerce Directive.

The Commission's DSMS and CJEU case law: what relationship?

The proposal
(for a directive on copyright
in the Digital Single Market)

As reported by this blog, on 14 September last the EU Commission unveiled its second copyright package, ie a new set of proposals [the first being the proposed regulation on cross-border content portability in December 2015] aimed at improving the existing EU copyright framework as part of its Digital Single Market Strategy (DSMS).

Among the contents of the package, so far what has attracted the greatest degree of attention is the Commission's proposal for a directive on copyright in the Digital Single Market (DSM Directive). 

Much has been said on the ambitiousness (or lack thereof) and merits (or demerits, depending on one's own perspective) of relevant provisions, notably those regarding new mandatory exceptions [Articles 3 to 6], a new related right in press publications [Article 11], and the so called value gap [Article 13].

Discussion has been focusing on the relationship between the new proposed directive and the existing body of legislation [for instance: is Article 13 compatible with the Ecommerce Directive? The DSM Directive is silent as regards how it relates to this piece of EU legislation] and the economic/legal rationale of the various initiatives [do we really need a new related right for press publishers, and will it change anything?].

The DSM Directive and the CJEU: why asking?

What however appears to have been left partly out of the debate is what relationship the DSM Directive has and will have with the existing body of case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).

The question is worth addressing for two main reasons, I think.

First, because the DSM Directive itself attempts a codification of CJEU case law. Examples are Recital 38 [with regard to the 2009 decision in L'Oréal, noted here] and Recital 36 [with regard to the 2015 decision in Reprobel, noted here].

Secondly, because the DSM refers to key concepts but fails to define them. This is particularly the case of 'communication to the public'. For instance, from Recital 38 it is apparent that an obligation for hosting providers that "store and provide access to the public to copyright protected works or other subject-matter uploaded by their users" to conclude licensing agreements with rightholders arises when they perform an act of communication to the public. Similarly, with regard to the press publishers' right, Recital 33 clarifies (?) that this new related right would not go as far as including "acts of hyperlinking which do not constitute communication to the public" within its scope.

Does the proposed directive
re-write certain CJEU case law?

(1) A "codification" of existing CJEU case law: a good attempt?

Starting from the first question, while in principle it is laudable that policy action considers and addresses the implications of judicial decisions, in the case of the DSM Directive this attempt may prove controversial.

Recital 38 states that "[i]n respect of Article 14 [of the Ecommerce Directive], it is necessary to verify whether the service provider plays an active role, including by optimising the presentation of the uploaded works or subject-matter or promoting them, irrespective of the nature of the means used therefor." 

From this it could appear that: optimisation → active role → ineligibility for Article 14 safe harbour

But is this what the CJEU really said in L'Oréal [and previously, in Google France]? Didn't the Court rather state [simplifying] that: active role, eg optimisation → knowledge/control data stored →  ineligibility for Article 14 safe harbour

Rather than codifying L'Oréal - at Recital 38 the Commission has created done something different, in the sense that the knowledge/control element appears to have vanished. Does this mean that falling within Article 14 safe harbour might become increasingly difficult for hosting providers that give access to "large amounts of works"? If it was sufficient for a hosting provider to optimise results [even by means of an automated process and even without the need for any knowledge/control of relevant data] to be outside the boundaries of the safe harbour, then Article 14 would become applicable in the [very tiny, eg possibly only Dropbox-like situations] minority of cases ...

Turning to Recital 36, the Commission appears to link the introduction of a press publishers' right to the outcome of the Reprobel case. But did that case [beneficiaries of private copying levies on printers' sales] have to do with "press publications" or "digital uses" at all? No, so the raison d'être of Recital 36 is a bit difficult to grasp ...

Acts of "communication to the public"

(2) Lack of definition of key concepts

Turning to the second point, the DSM Directive refers extensively to a concept that the InfoSoc Directive itself fails to define, ie "communication to the public".

It has taken the CJEU several judgments to try and make sense of the notion of "communication to the public", but as of today it is unclear whether the subjects referred to in Article 13 of the DSM Directive would be considered as making acts of communication to the public themselves. Yet, the entire Article 13 is built - and almost considers it a given - on the idea that hosting providers may be primarily liable for unauthorised acts of communication ...

In the recent GS Media decision [discussed here, here, here, here], the CJEU confirmed that if one construes communication as merely requiring the making available of a work, ie without the need for any actual transmission, then what needs to be considered is "the indispensable role played by the user and the deliberate nature of its intervention. The user makes an act of communication when it intervenes, in full knowledge of the consequences of its action, to give access to a protected work to its customers, and does so, in particular, where, in the absence of that intervention, its customers would not, in principle, be able to enjoy the ... work" [para 35]

One could wonder whether in the case of hosting platforms, it is the host or rather the user that plays such indispensable role to give access to a protected work.

As I noted here, in light of certain decisions of the CJEU and national courts alike, it may be argued that – in the case of a copyright work made available through the service of a passive online intermediary (host) – the latter would not commit an act of (unauthorised) communication to the public (potentially giving rise to primary liability for copyright infringement), because the role that is ‘indispensable’ in the whole process is the one of the third-party/uploader, rather than that of the hosting provider. 

Should anything be changed
in the proposed directive?

A similar degree of uncertainty also exists in relation to Recital 33, with the addition that in the case of the press publishers' right it is not entirely clear why Article 11 refers to the making available right [ie a sub-species of the right of communication to the public, as the CJEU clarified in C More, noted here] while Recital 33 refers to the right of communication to the public ...

All in all the DSM Directive fails to define what is to be intended by "communication to the public" and the questions becomes whether this would raise uncertainties when determining when a host provider is required - as opposed to merely 'invited' - to conclude licensing agreements.

Conclusion

Unlike legislative proposals advanced in the past, from the DSM Directive it is clear that EU legislature is to give account not only of existing legislation but also CJEU case law and its impact. 

While this demonstrates both the relevance of the CJEU in shaping the EU copyright regime and the attention that different EU institutions devote to each other's activity, it also raises questions regarding the substance of such interplay and resulting 'power struggles'.

On the one hand, the DSM Directive seems to engage in an attempt to codify or even re-write and remedy to 'negative' [negative, but for whom?] outcomes of CJEU cases. Recital 38 and L'Oréal is an example but an even more bizarre one if Recital 36 and Reprobel ...

On the other hand, certain provisions in the DSM Directive [eg Article 13] are built around certain key notions, eg 'communication to the public', that at the legislative level are defined nowhere. The question thus becomes whether the resulting gaps should be filled by referring to relevant CJEU decisions. If this was the case than the results might not be those wished for by certain categories of stakeholders ...